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ABSTRACT
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions. When individuals meet
repeatedly, they can use conditional strategies to enforce cooperative outcomes that would not be feasible in one-shot social
dilemmas. Direct reciprocity requires that individuals keep track of their past interactions and find the right response. However,
there are natural bounds on strategic complexity: Humans find it difficult to remember past interactions accurately, especially
over long timespans. Given these limitations, it is natural to ask how complex strategies need to be for cooperation to
evolve. Here, we study stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations to systematically compare the evolutionary
performance of reactive strategies, which only respond to the co-player’s previous move, and memory-one strategies, which
take into account the own and the co-player’s previous move. In both cases, we compare deterministic strategy and stochastic
strategy spaces. For reactive strategies and small costs, we find that stochasticity benefits cooperation, because it allows for
generous-tit-for-tat. For memory one strategies and small costs, we find that stochasticity does not increase the propensity
for cooperation, because the deterministic rule of win-stay, lose-shift works best. For memory one strategies and large costs,
however, stochasticity can augment cooperation.
Introduction
Direct reciprocity, the propensity to return cooperative acts of others, is one of the major mechanisms to establish coopera-
tion.1–3 The theory of reciprocity has allowed us to understand under which conditions “a shadow of the future” can help
individuals to forego individual short-run benefits in favour of mutually beneficial long-run relationships.4–13 Although recip-
rocal relationships also seem to be at work in several animal species,14–16 they play a particular role for human interactions.17
Because almost all our social interactions occur repeatedly, reciprocity considerations may have played an important role for
the evolution of social heuristics,18,19 which in turn helps to understand why we also cooperate with strangers,20 sometimes
even without considering the resulting costs to ourselves.21
To model the emergence of direct reciprocity, researchers often use the example of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. In this
game, two players can decide repeatedly whether to cooperate or to defect. While mutual cooperation is optimal from a group
perspective, players may feel a temptation to defect at the expense of the co-player. Strategies for the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma can become arbitrarily complex – sophisticated players may use the whole past history of play when making the
decision whether to cooperate in the next round. In practice, however, several experiments suggest that the complexity of
human strategies is restricted. For example, Stevens et al.22 have shown that subjects have problems to remember their co-
players’ past decisions accurately, especially if they need to keep track of several co-players or multiple rounds. Similarly,
the research of Wedekind and Milinski23,24 suggests that there is a trade-off between having a sophisticated strategy in the
prisoner’s dilemma and performing well in a second unrelated task. In addition, recent studies in behavioural economics have
found that most of the strategies employed by human subjects are well described by simple strategies that only depend on the
last interaction,25–29 although there are also other factors such as the average fraction of past cooperative acts.30,31 Given that
there are such constraints on the complexity of strategies, can we still expect cooperation to evolve? And how complex do the
players’ strategies need to be in order to allow for substantial cooperation?
Herein, we approach this question by comparing the evolving cooperation rates for different strategy spaces for the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma. The considered strategy spaces differ along two dimensions of complexity. The first dimension is the
input that they require: whereas reactive strategies (or memory-1/2 strategies) only require information about the co-player’s
previous move,32–34 memory-one strategies additionally need to take one’s own move into account.35 The set of reactive
strategies is a reasonable and conventional choice to define a subset of memory-one strategies, because a player’s payoff
crucially depends on the co-player’s move in the prisoner’s dilemma. The second dimension is the strategy’s stochasticity.
Here, we distinguish strategies that respond to past outcomes in a deterministic fashion, and strategies that prescribe to
randomize. Overall, these two independent dimensions of complexity lead to four different strategy classes.
To assess whether a given strategy class is favourable to the evolution of cooperation, we consider the Moran process in a finite
population of players.36 Individuals can choose freely among the available strategies, and over time they learn to switch to
strategies that yield a higher payoff. By assuming that mutations are sufficiently rare, we can use the framework of Fudenberg
& Imhof37 to calculate how often players use each of the available strategies in the long run.38 This in turn allows us to
calculate the evolving cooperation rates for each of the four strategy classes, as explained in more detail in the next section.
Our results suggest that strategies with larger memory are typically beneficial for the evolution of cooperation, whereas the
strategies’ stochasticity can sometimes have a detrimental effect.
Model and Methods
It is common to consider two levels when modelling the evolutionary dynamics of repeated games. The first level focuses on
the repeated game itself. At this level, we look at a single instance of the repeated game and we calculate how the players’
strategies determine the resulting cooperation rates and average payoffs. The second level describes the population dynamics.
Here, we look at a whole population of players. Each player is equipped with a strategy for how to play the repeated game.
The abundance of a given strategy within the population may change over time, because strategies that lead to a high payoff
are expected to spread (either due to reproduction of successful individuals, or due to imitation and cultural learning). At
the population level, we are interested in how often a strategy will be used in the long run, and what the resulting average
cooperation rate is. In the following, we describe these two levels in more detail.
Game dynamics of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma
In the prisoner’s dilemma, two individuals decide simultaneously whether to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). A player who
cooperates pays a cost c > 0 to provide a benefit b > c for the co-player. Thus, a cooperator either gets b− c (if the co-player
cooperates as well) or −c (if the co-player defects). On the other hand, a defector either gets b (if the co-player cooperates) or
0 (if the co-player defects). To reduce the number of free parameters, we can set b := 1 and we let c vary between 0< c<1.
Moreover, to avoid negative payoffs, we add the constant c to all payoffs. Under these assumptions, the payoff matrix of the
prisoner’s dilemma takes the form
C D
C
D
(
1 0
1+ c c
)
.
(1)
Because c<1, both players prefer mutual cooperation over mutual defection; however, since c>0, each individual is tempted
to play D irrespective of the co-player’s action. If the prisoner’s dilemma is played in a well-mixed population, evolution
favours defection.
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The question of evolutionary strategy selection becomes more interesting when individuals have the option to reciprocate past
actions in the future. To model such repeated interactions, we consider two individuals who play the game (1) for infinitely
many rounds. Strategies for such repeated games need to prescribe an action for any possible history of previous play, and
they can become arbitrarily complex. To facilitate an evolutionary analysis, we assume herein that individuals at most make
use of simple memory-one strategies. That is, their behaviour in any given round may only depend on the outcome of the
previous round. Memory-one strategies can be written as a 4-tuple, p = (pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD). The entries pi j correspond
to the player’s probability to cooperate in the next round, given that the focal player’s previous action was i and that the
co-player’s action was j. We assume that players only have imperfect control over their actions, such that they mis-implement
their intended action with some small probability ε > 0.5,39 Under this assumption, the player’s effective strategy becomes
p′ = (1− ε)p+ ε(1−p).
When both players apply memory-one strategies p and q, respectively, then the dynamics of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma
takes the form of a Markov chain with four possible states CC, CD, DC, DD (the possible outcomes of each round). The
transition matrix of this Markov chain is given by


p′CCq
′
CC p
′
CC(1− q′CC) (1− p′CC)q′CC (1− p′CC)(1− q′CC)
p′CDq
′
DC p
′
CD(1− q′DC) (1− p′CD)q′DC (1− p′CD)(1− q′DC)
p′DCq
′
CD p
′
DC(1− q′CD) (1− p′DC)q′CD (1− p′DC)(1− q′CD)
p′DDq′DD p′DD(1− q′DD) (1− p′DD)q′DD (1− p′DD)(1− q′DD)

 . (2)
Due to the assumption of errors, all entries of this transition matrix are positive. Therefore, there exists a unique invariant
distribution v = (vCC,vCD,vDC,vDD), representing the probability to find the two players in each of the four states over the
course of the game. Given the invariant distribution v, we can calculate player 1’s payoff as pi(p,q) = v ·h1 and player 2’s
payoff as pi(q,p) = v ·h2, with h1 = (1,0,1+ c,c) and h2 = (1,1+ c,0,c). Similarly, we can calculate the players’ average
cooperation rate in the repeated game as γ(p,q) = vCC+vCD and γ(q,p) = vCC+vDC. If the cooperation rate γ(p,p) of a
strategy against itself converges to one as the error rate ε goes to zero, we call the strategy p a self-cooperator (see also
ref. 40). Similarly, strategies for which the cooperation rate γ(p,p) approaches zero are called self-defectors.
We are interested in how the complexity of the strategy space affects the evolution of cooperation. To this end, we distinguish
two dimensions of complexity. The first dimension is the input that the strategy takes into consideration. Players with a
memory-1 strategy take the full outcome of the previous round into account, whereas players with a reactive strategy (or
memory-1/2 strategy) only consider the co-player’s previous move (but not the own move). The second dimension is the
strategy’s stochasticity. Players with a deterministic strategy respond to past outcomes in a deterministic fashion, whereas
players with a stochastic strategy may randomize between cooperation and defection. Combining these two dimensions, we
end up with four different strategy spaces, as summarized in Table 1.
These four strategy spaces are partially ordered, M1/2 ⊆M1 ⊆ ˆM1 and M1/2 ⊆ ˆM1/2 ⊆ ˆM1 (there is no order between
ˆM1/2 and M1). Examples of deterministic reactive strategies include AllD = (0,0,0,0), AllC = (1,1,1,1) and Tit-for-Tat,
T FT = (1,0,1,0). An example of a stochastic reactive strategy is generous Tit-for-Tat, GTFT = (1,1−c/b,1,1−c/b) (see
refs. 41, 42). Finally, as two examples of deterministic memory-one strategies which are not reactive, we mention the Grim
Trigger strategy, GT = (1,0,0,0), and Win-stay Lose-shift, WSLS = (1,0,0,1). GT switches to relentless defection after any
deviation from mutual cooperation; WSLS, on the other hand, sticks to an action if and only if it has been successful in the
previous round.43–45
Population dynamics
To describe the evolutionary dynamics on the population level, we use the Moran process4,36,46,47 in the limit of rare muta-
tions.37,48,49 That is, we consider a population of size N, and we suppose that new mutant strategies are sufficiently rare such
that at any moment in time at most two different strategies are present in the population. If there are i individuals who adopt
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Reactive strategies Memory-1 strategies
Deterministic
strategies
Deterministic reactive strategies, M1/2
pCC = pDC, pCD= pDD
pi j ∈ {0,1}
Deterministic memory-1 strategies, M1
pi j ∈ {0,1}
Stochastic
strategies
Stochastic reactive strategies, ˆM1/2
pCC = pDC, pCD= pDD
pi j ∈ [0,1]
Stochastic memory-1 strategies, ˆM1
pi j ∈ [0,1]
Table 1. Four different strategy spaces considered in this work. Each parameter pi j denotes the focal player’s probability to
cooperate in the next round, given that the player’s previous action was i and that the co-player’s action was j.
the strategy p, and N− i individuals who adopt the strategy q, the average payoffs for the two groups of players are
Fi =
(i− 1) ·pi(p,p)+ (N− i) ·pi(p,q)
N− 1
(3)
Gi =
i ·pi(q,p)+ (N− i− 1) ·pi(q,q)
N− 1
. (4)
We assume that the fitness of a strategy is a linear function of its payoff. Specifically, if the fitness of the strategies p and q is
denoted by fi and gi, respectively, then
fi = 1+w ·Fi (5)
gi = 1+w ·Gi. (6)
The constant terms on the right-hand side correspond to the player’s background fitness, and the parameter w is a measure for
the strength of selection. When w → 0, payoffs become irrelevant, and both strategies have approximately equal fitness. We
refer to this special case as the limit of weak selection.
The abundance of a strategy can change over time, depending on the strategy’s relative success. We consider a simple birth-
death process. In each time step, one individual is randomly chosen for death, and its place is filled with the offspring of
another individual, which is randomly chosen proportional to its fitness. That is, if T±i denotes the probability that the number
of individuals with strategy p becomes i± 1 after one time step, then we can calculate
T+i =
(
i fi
i fi +(N− i)gi
)(
N− i
N
)
(7)
T−i =
(
(N− i)gi
i fi +(N− i)gi
)(
i
N
)
. (8)
The quantities T+i and T
−
i can be used to compute the probability that eventually the whole population will adopt strategy p.36
In the special case that the population starts from a state in which only a single player applies p, this fixation probability ρ is
given by
ρ(p,q) =
[
1+
N−1
∑
j=1
j
∏
i=1
T−i
T+i
]−1
. (9)
If there is no selection (i.e., if w=0), the fixation probability for any mutant strategy p simplifies to ρ(p,q) = 1/N. For positive
selection strength w> 0, we thus say that the mutant strategy p is advantageous, neutral, or disadvantageous if ρ(p,q) is larger,
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equal, or smaller than 1/N, respectively. Conversely, we say that the resident strategy q is evolutionary robust if there is no
advantageous mutant strategy.40,50
For strategy spaces S with finitely many strategies, S = {p1, . . . ,pn}, we can use the above formula for the fixation proba-
bilities to calculate the long-run abundance of each strategy. For sufficiently rare mutations, the evolutionary process can be
described by a Markov chain with state space S , corresponding to the homogeneous populations in which everyone applies the
same strategy (see ref. 37). The off-diagonal entries of the transition matrix M = (m jk) are given by m jk = ρ(pk,p j)/(n− 1);
starting in a population in which everyone uses strategy p j, the probability that the next mutant adopts strategy pk is 1/(n−1),
and the probability that the mutant strategy reaches fixation is ρ(pk,p j). The diagonal entries of the transition matrix have the
form m j j = 1−∑k 6= j ρ(pk,p j)/(n−1), which can be interpreted as the probability that the next mutant strategy will go extinct.
For any finite selection strength w, the stochastic transition matrix M has a unique invariant distribution ξ = (ξ1, . . . ,ξn). The
entries of ξ represent the frequency with which each strategy is used in the selection-mutation equilibrium. Note that the exact
value of the mutation rate is unimportant in calculating the invariant distribution as long as the transition matrix M is positive
definite. Using this invariant distribution ξ , one can compute the average payoff in the population over time as
pi =
n
∑
j
ξ j ·pi(p j,p j). (10)
Similarly, one can compute the population’s average cooperation rate as
γ =
n
∑
j
ξ j · γ(p j,p j). (11)
These two expressions average over all self-interactions of strategies, because in the rare-mutation limit the population is
almost always homogeneous. The measure γ takes into account how much each strategy actually contributes to the cooperative
behaviour of a population. A strategy’s contribution may not always be clear from its definition. For example, the strategy
GT = (1,0,0,0) is a self-defector (as any defection by mistake will cause it to respond with indefinite defection), whereas
W SLS = (1,0,0,1) is a self-cooperator, although the two strategies differ by just one bit.
When the strategy space is infinite (as for stochastic strategy spaces), we cannot apply the previous method directly. Instead,
we use two different approximations. The first approach is to discretise the state spaces S = ˆM1/2 and S = ˆM1. That is,
instead of allowing for arbitrary conditional cooperation probabilities pi j ∈ [0,1], the probabilities are restricted to some finite
grid pi j = {0,1/m,2/m, . . . ,1}, where 1/m is the grid size. As our second approach, we use the method of Imhof & Nowak.51
This method starts with an arbitrary resident strategy p(0). This resident is then challenged by a single mutant with strategy
q, with q being taken from a uniform distribution over the space of all memory-one strategies. If the mutant goes extinct,
we define p(1) = p(0); otherwise, the mutant becomes the new resident and p(1) = q. This elementary step is repeated for t
iterations, leading to a sequence of successive resident populations (p(0),p(1), . . . ,p(t)). Using this approach, we can calculate
the average payoff of the population as pi = ∑tj pi(p( j),p( j))/t, and the average cooperation rate as γ = ∑tj γ(p( j),p( j))/t. As
we will see, the two complementary approaches give similar results – provided that the grid size 1/m used for the first method
is sufficiently small, and that the number of iterations t used for the second method is sufficiently large.
Analytical methods in the limit of weak selection
In addition to the above numerical methods, one can use perturbative methods to compute exact strategy abundance in the
limit of weak selection.52,53 For a finite strategy space of size n, the assumption of weak selection implies that each strategy
pi is approximately played with probability 1/n, plus a deviation term that is proportional to
Li =
1
n
n
∑
j=1
(
pi(pi,pi)+pi(pi,p j)−pi(p j,pi)−pi(p j,p j)
)
. (12)
When Li > 0, we say that the strategy pi is favoured by selection. The analogous quantity for infinite strategy spaces (see also
ref. 53) is given by
L(p) =
∫
[pi(p,p)+pi(p,q)−pi(q,p)−pi(q,q)]dq. (13)
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Figure 1. Evolutionary dynamics in the space of deterministic reactive strategies, M1/2. (a) Illustration of the dynamical
process. Each grey circle represents a homogeneous population using one of the four possible strategies. Blue lines indicate
whether a mutant strategy is advantageous (solid line), neutral (dashed line), or disadvantageous (dotted line). For
advantageous mutants, the blue numbers show the mutant’s fixation probability according to Eq. (9). The graph suggests
there are two likely paths for evolution: a short cycle from AllD to TFT to AllC and back to AllD, or the longer cycle
through AllD, T FT , AllC, ATFT , and back to AllD (in particular, eliminating the second cycle by removing ATFT from the
strategy set would only lead to a minor modification of the general dynamics). The numbers within the grey circles give the
abundance of each strategy according to the invariant distribution of the dynamical process; for the chosen parameters, AllD
is the most abundant strategy. (b) and (c) show the abundance of each strategy depending on the cost of cooperation and for
two different selection strengths w = 0.1 and w = 10. Other parameters: population size N = 100, error rate ε = 0.01, and in
(a) w = 0.1.
In this expression
∫
dq is the short-hand notation for the four-dimensional integral
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0 dqCCdqCDdqDCdqDD, which
in most cases needs to be computed numerically (see Appendix). By looking for maxima of L(p), we can determine the
stochastic strategy that is most favoured by selection in the weak-selection limit.
Results
In the following, we first discuss the dynamics in each of the four considered strategy spaces separately, and then we compare
the resulting cooperation levels and average payoffs.
Strategy dynamics among the deterministic reactive strategies
The space of deterministic reactive strategies M1/2 consists of the four strategies AllD, AllC, T FT , and the somewhat para-
doxical Anti-Tit-for-Tat, AT FT = (0,1,0,1), which cooperates if and only if the co-player was a defector in the previous
round. For any set of parameters, we can use the methods explained in the previous section to calculate the fixation probability
of a mutant with strategy q in an otherwise homogeneous population using strategy p.
Figure 1a illustrates this procedure in a population of size N = 100. If the resident population applies the strategy AllD, then
neither AllC nor AT FT are advantageous. A single mutant player with strategy T FT , however, has a fixation probability
ρ = 0.013 > 1/100 in an AllD population. TFT can invade because it cannot be exploited:54–57 on average, a T FT player
gets the mutual defection payoff c when matched with an AllD-opponent, but it gets (1+ c)/2 > c when interacting with a
T FT -opponent. However, once T FT has reached fixation, a mutant adopting AllC can easily invade. AllC is more robust to
errors – when two T FT players meet and one player defects by mistake, this can result in long and costly vendettas between
the two players, whereas AllC players would not encounter that problem. But a homogeneous population of unconditional
cooperators is quickly undermined by defectors, or by AT FT players (who themselves are typically replaced by defectors).
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Figure 2. Evolutionary dynamics in the space of deterministic memory-one strategies, M1 for two different cooperation
costs. As in Figure 1a, the grey circles correspond to all possible homogeneous populations, and blue lines indicate
evolutionary transitions; for clarity, we only show transitions from W SLS or AllD. In (a), the cost of cooperation is
sufficiently low such that WSLS is evolutionary robust. In (b), mutants using AllD, Grim Trigger GT , or the strategy
(0,0,0,1) can invade a W SLS population; as a consequence, AllD becomes most abundant in the selection-mutation
equilibrium. Parameters are the same as in Figure 1, population size N = 100, error rate ε = 0.01, and selection strength
w = 0.1.
Overall, we end up with an evolutionary cycle: cooperation can evolve starting from a population of defectors, but cooperation
is not stable.
In the long run, most of the time is spent in a homogeneous AllD population (for the parameters used in Figure 1a, the
abundance of AllD is 61.9%). The reason for AllD’s predominance is its relative stability: it takes two TFT players to have
a selective advantage in an AllD population (a single TFT player only obtains the same payoff c that the other AllD players
receive). In contrast, it takes only one AllC player to have a selective advantage in a T FT population, and it takes only one
AllD player to have an advantage in an AllC population. The dynamics within the space of deterministic reactive strategies is
largely independent of the specific parameters being used. A numerical analysis shows that AllD remains the most abundant
strategy in the selection-mutation equilibrium for both small (Figure 1b) and large (Figure 1c) selection strengths.
We can further confirm these numerical results by analytical means when we look at the limit of weak selection. For the space
M1/2, the linear coefficients Li according to Eq. (12) simplify to
LAllD = c(1− 2ε)> 0
LTFT = LATFT = 0
LAllC =−c(1− 2ε)< 0.
(14)
Thus, when selection is weak, AllD is the most abundant strategy for all values of c.
Strategy dynamics among the deterministic memory-one strategies
Let us next consider the space of deterministic memory-one strategies, which contains all 16 tuples of the form (pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD)
with pi j ∈ {0,1}. Although the state space is now bigger, we can still apply the previous methods to calculate each strategy’s
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share in the selection-mutation equilibrium. Figure 2 illustrates two different parameter scenarios (both assuming an interme-
diate selection strength, w = 0.1). When the costs of cooperation are sufficiently low (Figure 2a), the self-cooperating strategy
W SLS is evolutionary robust: all other mutant strategies have a fixation probability smaller than 1/N. In contrast, a population
of defectors is not robust: AllD is susceptible to invasion by TFT , WSLS, or by the strategy (0,0,1,0). As a consequence,
W SLS is the strategy that is most frequently used over time – in the invariant distribution, the share of W SLS is 26.0%, whereas
the share of AllD is only 10.9%.
The situation changes, however, when the cooperation costs exceed a critical threshold, as in Figure 2b. In that case, WSLS
ceases to be evolutionary robust. For example, in a homogeneous population of WSLS players, playing WSLS yields the mutual
cooperation payoff 1, whereas playing AllD yields the temptation payoff 1+ c in one round and the mutual defection payoff
c in every other round. Consequently, AllD receives the higher payoff whenever c > 1/2. Although AllD is not evolutionary
robust either, it now obtains the largest share in the selection-mutation equilibrium (with 26.6%, as compared to the 7.8% of
W SLS). Numerical calculations confirm that AllD becomes the most abundant strategy as the cost-to-benefit ratio approaches
1/2 (see Figure 3). On the positive side, when cooperation is relatively cheap and when selection is strong, WSLS can reach
almost 100% in the selection-mutation equilibrium (Figure 3c).
Again, we can derive analytical results in the limit of weak selection by calculating the linear coefficients Li according to
Eq. (12). There are only a handful of strategies for which Li > 0 independent of the value of c (see also Figure 3a). Among
these are AllD and WSLS,
LWSLS = (151− 89c)/240+O(ε),
LAllD = c+O(ε).
(15)
In particular, WSLS is most abundant when LWSLS > LAllD, or equivalently, when c < c0 := 151/329+O(ε)≈ 0.46.
Strategy dynamics among the stochastic reactive strategies
Let us next turn to stochastic reactive strategies. In that case, players only pay attention to the co-player’s previous move (i.e.,
pCC = pDC and pCD = pDD), but now they are able to choose their cooperation probabilities from the unit interval, pi j ∈ [0,1].
In particular, there are now infinitely many feasible strategies, which renders a full calculation of all transitions between
possible homogeneous populations impossible. To cope with this issue, we have used two numerical approximations. The
first method approximates the infinite state space by a finite grid (to which the previously used methods for finite strategy
spaces can be applied). For two different cost values, we have illustrated the resulting invariant distribution in the upper
panels of Figure 4a and 4b. Figure 4a indicates that when cooperation costs are low, there are two strategy regions with a high
abundance according to the invariant distribution. The first region corresponds to a neighbourhood of AllD (i.e. strategies for
which both conditional cooperation probabilities are low); the second region comprises a set of generous strategies. In that
region, players always reciprocate their opponent’s cooperation, while still exhibiting some degree of forgiveness in case the
opponent defected in the previous round. However, as the cooperation costs increase (as in Figure 4b for which c = 0.6), the
region of generous strategies is visited less often, and defective strategies become predominant.
We obtain a similar result when we use our second method to approximate the dynamics within the space of stochastic reactive
strategies. For this method, we have applied the dynamics of Imhof & Nowak:51 starting from a population of defectors, we
have repeatedly introduced single mutants into the population, who may adopt an arbitrary stochastic strategy (i.e., this time,
strategies are not restricted to some finite grid). The mutant strategy may then either fixate or go extinct, leading to a sequence
of resident populations over time. The lower panels in 4a and 4b depict the residents in this sequence as blue dots (for clarity,
we have only plotted those resident populations that survived at least 50 mutant invasions). Again, low cooperation costs lead
to two clusters in the two-dimensional state space – a cluster with defective strategies and a cluster with generous strategies.
But as before, the cluster of generous strategies tends to shrink as the cooperation costs increase (as also observed in ref. 51).
We have also numerically computed the stochastic reactive strategy that is most favoured by selection (see Figure 4c). There
are three parameter regions: for cost-to-benefit ratios below 1/4, we observe that the most favoured strategy is generous.
However, as the cooperation costs increase and the cost-to-benefit ratio is between 1/4 and 2/5, the most favoured strategy
prescribes that players should no longer reciprocate cooperation, and players should only cooperate with some low probability
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(a) Linear coefficients according to Eq. (12)
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(b) Abundance of strategies under intermediate selection (w=0.1)
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(c) Abundance of strategies under strong selection (w=10)
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Figure 3. Selection-mutation equilibrium in the space of memory-one strategies for different costs and selection strengths.
The graphs in (a) show the linear coefficients Li according to Eq. (12), whereas the graphs in (b) and (c) show the strategy
abundance for intermediate (w = 0.1) and strong (w = 10) selection, respectively. In each case, the 16 curves are plotted in
three different panels (depending on the strategy’s abundance), in order to increase the clarity of the Figure. WSLS is most
abundant when cooperation is cheap, whereas AllD and GT become predominant as c exceeds a critical threshold. The other
parameters are the same as before, N = 100 and ε = 0.01.
when the opponent defected in the previous round. Clearly, a population made up of such players only achieves low levels of
cooperation. The situation becomes even worse as the cost-to-benefit ratio exceeds 2/5, in which case unconditional defection
becomes the most favoured strategy.
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Figure 4. Evolutionary dynamics in the space of stochastic reactive strategies, ˆM1/2. (a) and (b) illustrate our
approximation for the invariant distribution for two different cost values, c = 0.2 and c = 0.6. For the upper graphs, we have
calculated the invariant distribution for the discretised state space, where the conditional cooperation probabilities of the
reactive strategy are taken from the (finite) set {0,δ ,2δ , . . . ,1− δ ,1}, using a grid size δ = 0.02. Areas in dark blue colour
correspond to strategy regions that have a relatively high frequency in the invariant distribution. The lower graphs show the
results of simulations for the Imhof-Nowak process;51 each blue dot represents a strategy adopted by the resident population.
Both methods confirm that when the cost of cooperation is small, e.g. c = 0.2, the resident strategies are either clustered
around the lower left corner or around the right edge of the state space. As the cost increases, more weight is given to the
lower edge. In (c) we show the strategy that is most favoured in the limit of weak selection, i.e., the strategy with the highest
linear coefficient L(p) according to Eq. (13). The graph indicates that there are three parameter regions: for low cost values,
a generous strategy is most favoured; for intermediate cost values, the most favoured strategy has only a positive cooperation
probability if the co-player defected previously; and for high cooperation costs AllD is most favoured. Parameters:
Population size N = 100, ε = 0.01, and w = 10; the Imhof-Nowak process was simulated over 5 ·106 mutant strategies.
Strategy dynamics among the stochastic memory-one strategies
Finally, we can apply the same two approximations to the 4-dimensional space of all stochastic memory-one strategies. Of
course, that state space can no longer be depicted in a two-dimensional graph; but Figures 5a and 5b show the invariant
distribution for each of the four components pCC, pCD, pDC and pDD, again for the two cost values c = 0.2 and c = 0.6. For
c = 0.2 we observe behaviour that is consistent with WSLS. After mutual cooperation, players almost certainly continue
with cooperation, and after mutual defection players are more likely to cooperate than to defect, whereas the values of pCD
and pDC rather prescribe to defect in the next round. On the other hand, when c = 0.6, the invariant distribution shows a
bias towards self-defector strategies, as mutual defection in one round is most likely to lead to mutual defection in the next
round. Again, we have also calculated the strategy most favoured by selection in the limit of weak selection (Figure 5c). As
in the case of stochastic reactive strategies, there are three scenarios: a cooperative scenario in which the population applies
a variant of WSLS when cooperation costs are low; an intermediately cooperative scenario where the population uses the
strategy p∗ = (0,1,0,0); and a defection scenario of an AllD population when cooperation costs are high. Compared to the
case of reactive strategies, the fully cooperative strategy is now favoured for a wider range of cost values – the WSLS variant
is most abundant for costs c . 0.45, whereas the GTFT -like strategy depicted in Figure 4c can only succeed when c . 0.25.
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Figure 5. Evolutionary dynamics in the space of stochastic memory-one strategies, ˆM1. (a) and (b) show the marginal
distribution of the evolving cooperation probabilities pi j in the mutation-selection equilibrium. To generate the figure, we
have calculated the invariant distribution for a discretised version of the state space, using a grid size of δ = 0.2. For low
costs, the cooperation probabilities are in line with WSLS behaviour; for larger cost values, cooperation breaks down, and
most evolving strategies are self-defectors. In (c) we depict the strategy that has the highest linear coefficient L(p) according
to Eq. (13). Again there are three parameter regions: for low costs, a variant of WSLS is most favoured by selection; for
intermediate costs, the somewhat paradoxical strategy (0,1,0,0) is most favoured; and for high costs, AllD becomes
predominant. Parameters are the same as before: Population size N = 100, ε = 0.01, and w = 10.
W SLS variants of the form (1,0,0,x) have the advantage of being immune against the invasion by both, AllC and AllD mutants
(provided that x is sufficiently small for given cooperation costs). However, as opposed to the pure WSLS strategy (1,0,0,1),
strategies of the form (1,0,0,x) with x < 1 are not evolutionary robust. In the presence of errors, they can be invaded by
strategies that yield a better approximation to WSLS, (1,0,0,y) with y > x, which in turn are more susceptible to invasion by
AllD. As a consequence, we observe that the parameter region for which WSLS variants are most favoured in the space of
stochastic memory-one strategies is comparable to the region for which the pure WSLS strategy is most abundant among the
deterministic strategies (as depicted in Figure 3).
Among the strategies most favoured by selection, the strategy p∗ = (0,1,0,0) comes most unexpected.58 This strategy pre-
scribes to cooperate only if one has been exploited in the previous round – which seems to be a rather paradoxical response.
For small errors, a homogeneous population of p∗ players yields an expected payoff of pi∗ = (1+ 3c)/4; two p∗-players
would typically defect against each other, but if one of the player cooperates by error, there can be long periods of unilateral
cooperation. However, a single mutant applying AllD obtains the higher payoff (1+ 3c)/3, and thus one would expect that
homogeneous p∗ populations quickly disappear. But if p∗ is not evolutionary robust, how can it be most favoured by selection
for intermediate cost ranges?
Although AllD could easily invade a p∗–population, it is highly unlikely that within the space of stochastic memory-one
strategies the next mutant actually adopts AllD. Instead, most arising mutants would use strategies p = (pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD)
for which all cooperation probabilities pi j are strictly positive. In the limit of small errors, ε → 0, the payoff of such mutants
in a p∗–population can be computed as
pi =
1− pCD
1− pCD+ pDD
c. (16)
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Figure 6. Evolving cooperation rates for (a) unconditional strategies, (i.e., strategies that use the same cooperation
probability p in every round, independent of the past history), (b) reactive strategies, and (c) memory-one strategies. All
graphs show the abundance of cooperation as measured by the quantity γ in Eq. (11) for the case of deterministic strategies
(blue), and according to the Imhof-Nowak process for stochastic strategies (yellow; a discretised version of the continuous
space of memory-one strategies would yield similar results). Dots represent simulation results, whereas solid lines represent
numerically exact results derived from the invariant distribution of the evolutionary processes. Parameters: population size
N = 100, ε = 0.01, and w = 10.
This payoff is not only smaller than the residents’ payoff pi∗; it is exactly the same payoff that mutants would get in an AllD
population. Thus, the strategy p∗ = (0,1,0,0) can be successful because against almost all mutant strategies it behaves like
AllD; only against itself (and against a few other strategies, like against AllD) it cooperates occasionally. In a sense, p∗ acts
as if it used a rudimentary form of kin recognition - it shows some cooperation against players of the same kind, but it defects
against almost everyone else.
Comparison of the evolving cooperation rates
After analysing the strategy dynamics in each of the four strategy spaces separately, we are now in a position to compare the
evolving cooperation rates. For reactive strategies and low cooperation costs, stochastic strategies lead to more cooperation
than deterministic strategies (Figure 6b). As we have seen in Figure 1, deterministic reactive strategies are unable to stabilize
cooperation; T FT can be invaded by AllC, and AllC is easily invaded by AllD (see also ref. 59). Stochastic reactive strategies,
on the other hand, can maintain a healthy level of cooperation for a considerable time. GTFT -like strategies resist invasion
by AllD, and they are only destabilized when altruistic AllC-like strategies increase in frequency by neutral drift.42,51,60–63
However, with increasing cooperation costs, it takes longer until GTFT -like strategies emerge, as the so-called cooperation-
rewarding zone shrinks as c increases (see, for example, ref. 5), and GT FT -like strategies are more likely to be invaded
by overly altruistic strategies. As a result, when cooperation costs are high deterministic strategies perform slightly better,
because T FT mutants show up more quickly to re-invade AllD populations.
Memory-one strategies are generally more favourable to cooperation, as depicted in Figure 6c. In contrast to reactive strate-
gies, memory-one strategies allow for W SLS-like behaviour which is more stable against indirect invasion by altruistic AllC
strategies.44,64 Interestingly, however, we find that for low cooperation costs, deterministic memory-one strategies are better
in sustaining cooperation than stochastic strategies. Among the deterministic memory-one strategies, mutants are strongly
opposed by selection when they enter a WSLS population (as illustrated in Figure 2). As a result, WSLS reaches almost 100%
in the invariant distribution, provided that selection is sufficiently strong and that the costs of cooperation are low. There are
two reasons why stochastic strategies can result in less cooperation. First, although WSLS remains a Nash equilibrium,65,66
stochasticity allows for the invasion of nearby mutants (that are only slightly disfavoured by selection); these mutants may in
turn be more susceptible to invasion by AllD.67 Second, stochastic dynamics often generates resident populations that only
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Figure 7. U-shaped mutation kernels lead to more cooperation in high cost scenarios. As in Figure 6c, both graphs show the
evolving cooperation rate for the space of deterministic memory-one strategies (blue) and stochastic memory-one strategies
(yellow). However, here we have varied the error rate of players (ε = 1% for frequent errors, ε = 0.01% for rare errors). In
addition, the cooperation probabilities pi of new mutant strategies are now taken from a beta-distribution. The
beta-distribution has the density function f (p) =Cpα−1(1− p)β−1, with C being a normalization factor. The values
α = β = 1 yield the uniform distribution on [0,1], as used in Figure 6; here, we have taken α = β = 0.1, yielding a strongly
U-shaped distribution. All other parameters are the same as in Figure 6.
use an approximate version of WSLS, having the form (1,0,0,x), with x < 1. Compared to the deterministic W SLS rule, these
approximate versions are more prone to noise: if one of the players defected by error, it may take a substantial number of
rounds to re-establish mutual cooperation (which becomes most clear when x is close to zero).
This result is somewhat disappointing: especially in parameter regions in which WSLS is unstable, one would hope that
stochastic strategies allow at least for some degree of cooperation, because WSLS variants of the form (1,0,0,x) are immune to
the invasion of AllC and AllD mutants as explained above. The previous results on the effect of stochasticity need to be viewed
in light of the assumed mutation kernel – for our numerical results we have assumed that new mutant strategies are taken from
a uniform distribution. This assumption often generates mutant strategies with intermediate cooperation probabilities – which
have no chance of being evolutionary robust.40 What would happen if mutant strategies were instead taken from a distribution
that puts more weight on the boundary of the state space? In Figure 7, we show numerical results under the assumption
that the cooperation probabilities of new mutant strategies follow a U-shaped distribution on the interval [0,1]. Keeping the
previous error rate of ε = 0.01, the U-shaped mutation kernel seems to marginally increase the evolving cooperation rates for
most cost values (Figure 7a). If we additionally reduce the error rate to ε = 10−4, U-shaped mutations can lead to a more
dramatic increase in cooperation rates, especially for scenarios with intermediate cooperation costs. In that parameter region,
successful residents often apply strategies of the form (1− δ1,δ2,δ3,δ4) with all δi ≪ 1. Because δ4 ≪ 1, such residents can
hardly be exploited by AllD mutants. If, in addition, δ1 ≪ δ4, such strategies can still reach a substantial level of cooperation
against themselves. We note that strategies of the form (1−δ1,δ2,δ3,δ4) are not stable, as they could be invaded by strategies
that increase their cooperation probability after mutual defection. However, provided that δ1 is sufficiently small, the selective
advantage of such mutants would be comparably small, and hence it may take a long time until such mutant strategies appear
and fixate in the population. The results in Figure 7 thus suggest that the assumed mutation structure can have a considerable
impact on the evolving cooperation rates. Herein, we have considered two extreme structures, uniform mutations and strongly
U-shaped mutations, but a more general analysis of the impact of different mutation kernels would certainly be a worthwhile
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topic for future research.
Discussion and Summary
We have used the Moran process in finite populations to study the evolution of cooperation in repeated games. The math-
ematics of repeated games can be intricate. Even if one only considers a restricted strategy space, such as the space of all
memory-one strategies, it is typically hard to derive exact results for the resulting evolutionary dynamics. There are various
ways to cope with this complexity. Some studies have focused on even simpler strategy sets, consisting only of a handful
of representative strategies (e.g. refs. 7, 59, 61, 68). Others have obtained analytical results for certain infinitely-dimensional
subsets of memory-one strategies, like reactive strategies,51,60 zero-determinant strategies,62 or conformistic strategies.63 Yet
another approach is to use computer simulations (as in refs. 44, 69–71). Herein, we have taken a somewhat intermediate
approach. By assuming appropriate separation of time scales (e.g., mutations are sufficiently rare such that populations are
typically homogeneous), we can compute numerically exact strategy abundance in case the strategy space is finite (as in the
case of deterministic strategies). To explore the dynamics among stochastic strategies, we have extended this approach to
approximate the dynamics in infinite strategy spaces.
We have used this approach to systematically compare the evolutionary dynamics among strategy spaces of different complex-
ity. The strategy spaces considered differ along two dimensions, depending on whether strategies are reactive or memory-one,
and depending on whether strategies are deterministic or stochastic. Each of the four considered strategy spaces has been
explored previously, but only in isolation. Herein, we are explicitly interested how much complexity is needed to allow for a
healthy level of cooperation. In this way, our study contributes to a growing research effort, exploring how the evolution of
cooperation depends on underlying modelling assumptions. For example, Garcı´a and Traulsen72 and Stewart and Plotkin71
have analysed the role of the mutation structure on the emergence and stability of cooperation, whereas van den Berg and
Weissing73 have explored the consequences of two different strategy representations. We believe that this kind of research is
extremely useful, as it serves as an important robustness check for previous results on the evolution of direct reciprocity.
Our study provides at least two major insights. The first insight is that more complex strategies do not guarantee more
cooperation. More specifically, we have found that memory-one strategies, which also take one’s own previous move into
account, have a positive impact on cooperation. If players have no memory at all (i.e. if they can only use unconditional
strategies), evolution unambiguously promotes defection (as depicted in Figure 6a). However, if players can react to the co-
player’s previous move, or even better to the moves of both players, then evolution can promote cooperative strategies when
the costs of cooperation are sufficiently low. Although we have not tested memory-two strategies (i.e. players who react to
the outcome of the last two rounds), one may expect that such strategies could further facilitate cooperation, especially in
parameter regions in which the classical WSLS strategy becomes unstable (see, e.g. refs. 8, 74). The effect of stochasticity
on cooperation is more ambiguous. If players only remember the co-players’ previous move, then stochasticity allows for
generous strategies like GT FT , and such generous strategies can help to establish relatively high levels of cooperation. On
the other hand, when cooperation costs are low, and players are allowed to use memory-one strategies, stochastic strategies
cannot further promote cooperation. Here, the deterministic version of WSLS works best.
Our second insight is rather conceptual. To quantify the evolutionary success of some strategy p, it is common to check
whether the strategy is an equilibrium, or whether the strategy is evolutionary robust (see e.g. refs. 40, 50, 65, 66, 75). To this
end, one checks whether there would be a mutant strategy q that can prosper in a population of p players. A strategy that
is not robust is generally assumed to play a minor role during the evolutionary process. Yet, we have seen that under some
evolutionary conditions, the strategy p∗ = (0,1,0,0) can be surprisingly successful despite not being evolutionary robust. This
somewhat paradoxical strategy can persist because against almost all other strategies it plays like AllD; but against a handful
of strategies (including itself and against AllD) it cooperates for a substantial fraction of time. In particular, there are mutant
strategies that could invade into a homogeneous p∗ - population. However, the probability that such a mutant arises within a
reasonable timespan is vanishingly small, as the space of such advantageous mutants has measure zero within the space of all
memory-one strategies. Thus, it does not seem sufficient for evolutionary robustness to ask whether there is another strategy
that would have a higher fitness; one also needs to check whether this beneficial mutant strategy can arise under the considered
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mutation scheme. Put differently, unless a resident outperforms every other strategy, the question of evolutionary robustness
cannot be properly assessed without reference to the mutation scheme. Of course, this observation does not diminish the value
of traditional equilibrium considerations – but if a strategy is only unstable because some non-generic strategy can invade,
then some caution seems warranted.
Appendix: Computation of the linear coefficient L(p) for stochastic strategies
To compute the stochastic strategy that is most favoured by selection, we have evaluated the four-dimensional integral L(p)
in Eq. (13) by means of Gaussian quadrature.76 For maximizing L(p), we have employed a two-step approach: The first
step is exhaustive global search of the whole strategy space. Some degree of discretisation is inevitable in checking many
different realizations of p = (pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD). In particular, we have observed that the objective function L(p) tends to
change rapidly when i approaches the boundary of the strategy space. As the change is smoothed by the implementation
error, it is quite often the case that p′i j, or 1− p′i j, turns out to be O(ε). Therefore, the mesh size of pi j has been set to be
of an order of ε when getting close to zero or one. Specifically, we have used 174 = 83,521 grid points in total by adding
pi j = 0.005,0.01,0.02,0.98,0.99, and 0.995 to a regular mesh grid pi j = 0.1k (k = 0, . . . ,10).
The next step is the gradient-descent method,77 starting from the best strategy of the exhaustive search. Although this second
method is local, it works in a continuous space and finds out a nearby maximum with far higher precision than the grid search.
We expect that this two-step approach precisely locates the global maximum as long as the mesh of the first step is fine enough
to detect all the relevant variations of the objective function L(p).
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